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NOTES
KINDER, GENTLER, AND MORE
CAPRICIOUS: THE DEATH PENALTY
AFTER ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
JOHN F. ROMANOt
INTRODUCTION
William Jones and Daryl Atkins spent August 16, 1996
drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana.' They made several
trips to a local convenience store to replenish their alcohol
supply. On their final trip, Atkins concealed a handgun in his
waistband as the two resorted to panhandling.2 Eric Nesbitt, an
airman from Langley Air Force Base,3 arrived at the store
around 11:30 p.m. 4 As Nesbitt entered his truck, Atkins pointed
the gun at him and ordered him to move out of the driver's seat
and to allow Jones to drive.5 Atkins then stole sixty dollars from
Nesbitt's wallet and ordered him to remove two hundred dollars
from an ATM.6 They then drove to a secluded area where Atkins
ordered Nesbitt to exit the vehicle.7 Nesbitt took just a few steps
f J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.
Fordham University, 2001. I would like to dedicate this Note to the memory of my
cousin, Brian Cannizzaro, SJU 1993, FDNY, whose ultimate sacrifice, along with
that of thousands of others, on September 11, 2001, proved that glass and steel
could be broken and bent, but that no force could destroy the bravery, freedom, and
unity of the American people.
1 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 449 (Va. 1999), rev'd, 122 S. Ct.
2242 (2002).
2 Id. According to prosecutors and the testimony of William Jones, Atkins
received the gun that day from a friend, explaining that "he wanted to use it, [and]
he would bring it back in the morning." Id.
3 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2259 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 449.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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before Atkins unleashed eight shots from the handgun, striking
Nesbitt in his thorax, chest, abdomen, arms, and legs.8
The jury found Atkins guilty of the murder of Eric Nesbitt. 9
After hearing evidence about Atkins's violent past, which
included eighteen felony convictions, 10 the jury sentenced Atkins
to death." The Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly found that
despite Atkins's IQ score of fifty-nine, 12 he was able to
"appreciate the criminality of his conduct and understood that it
was wrong to shoot Nesbitt."1 3 The court affirmed the sentence
of death, finding that "the jury obviously found that Atkins's IQ
score did not mitigate his culpability."14
In a six to three ruling, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the death sentence imposed on Atkins and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 15 The Court did not find that
Atkins could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct, that
he was not deserving of punishment, or that he was not
competent to stand trial. 16 Rather, the Court ruled that Daryl
S Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2259 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 451. William Jones pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement in which he agreed to testify against Atkins. Id. at 449 n.3.
10 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 317 (Va. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct.
2242 (2002) (detailing the gruesome facts of these incidents, including one in which
Atkins shot a woman in the stomach without provocation).
11 Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 453. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
conviction of Atkins but remanded as to the sentence of death because of an
improper verdict form. Id. at 456-57. At the new sentencing hearing, the jury again
sentenced Atkins to death and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this
sentence. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321. The Court found ample evidence to support the
jury's finding of two statutory aggravating factors-future dangerousness and the
vileness of the crime. Id. at 317.
12 Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 319. Sub-average intellectual functioning is one of
three criteria required by the American Psychiatric Association in characterizing
individuals as mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 n.3
(2002) (listing the definitions used by the American Psychiatric Association and the
American Association of Mental Retardation). The individual must also exhibit
"significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety." Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000)). The final
requirement is that the onset of these characteristics must occur before age
eighteen. Id. An IQ level of fifty to seventy is generally considered indicative of mild
mental retardation. Id.
13 Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321.
14 Id. at 320.
'5 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
16 Id. at 2250-51.
[Vol.77:123
A MORE CAPRICIOUS DEATH PENALTY
Atkins belonged to a class of defendants whom modern society no
longer subjected to the death penalty because members of that
class "do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. 1 7
This Note examines the current state of death penalty
jurisprudence after the Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia. This
Note concludes that there is no basis for the Court's recent
attempt to exempt entire classes from the death penalty.'8 This
Note shows that such exemptions violate the tenets of the Eighth
Amendment 19 as enunciated by the Court in Furman v.
Georgia,20 and the spirit of that amendment as embodied in
those cases following Furman. This Note begins, in Part I, with
a background discussion of the Eighth Amendment and its
application to death penalty cases, with emphasis on the
requirements mandated by the Eighth Amendment after
Furman. Part II analyzes the Court's recent jurisprudence
regarding the death penalty as imposed on the mentally retarded
and on juveniles 21 and argues that the Court's approach to these
problems is fundamentally inconsistent with its Eighth
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence. Finally, Part III
proposes a number of alternative approaches to the problems
posed by the mentally retarded and juveniles who commit capital
crimes. This Note argues that the alternative approaches
conform more satisfactorily to the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.
17 Id. at 2244. But see id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("As long as a mentally
retarded offender knows 'the difference between right and wrong,'.., only the
sentencer can assess whether his retardation reduces his culpability enough to
exempt him from the death penalty for the particular murder in question.")
(citations omitted).
18 See In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472, 472-73 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(expressing the opinion that the Court should re-examine the constitutionality of
subjecting a defendant who committed his crime while under eighteen years of age
to the death penalty); Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24, 24 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (same). But see Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
20 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(determining that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of those
defendants who were under sixteen years of age at the time they committed their
crime).
2003]
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court and the Text of the Eighth Amendment
The original meaning of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is one that is not
readily deduced by its words or, based on the continued vitality
of this debate, by its background. 22 Early rulings by the Court
interpreted the Amendment to apply only to punishments that
were barbarous and inhumane.23 In the past one hundred years,
however, the Court has expanded the scope of the clause in a
number of important ways. First, the Eighth Amendment is not
to be read as prohibiting only those punishments found to be
cruel and unusual at the time of the Bill of Rights.24 The
meaning of the amendment should be drawn "from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."25 Second, punishment may be considered cruel and
unusual not only because of its nature26 but also because of its
degree.27 Thus, although one day in prison is not intrinsically a
22 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-75 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.)
(discussing at length the English history of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause and concluding that it was aimed at illegal punishments, not
disproportionate ones). But see Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 331-32 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the Founders understood the clause to proscribe
excessive punishments); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860, 865 (1969)
(arguing that the English history of the clause indicated that it contained a
guarantee against disproportionate punishments, but that the Framers
misinterpreted it as outlawing only torturous punishments).
23 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (explaining that within the
meaning of the Constitution, cruelty involved "something more than the mere
extinguishment of life."); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 131, 136 (1878) (upholding
a sentence of death by public shooting because it was not torturous and thus not
prohibited); see also Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution-A Justification for the
Execution of Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
155, 157-62 (1991) (discussing these early Eighth Amendment cases).
24 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (determining that the
Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice").
25 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). In Trop, the Court
ruled that the sentence of denationalization for the crime of desertion was cruel and
unusual despite the absence of torture or physical mistreatment. Id. The Court
determined that the consequences of statelessness were "obnoxious" and "offensive
to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands." Id. at 102.
26 See supra note 23 (giving examples of what is and is not cruel and unusual).
27 See Weems, 217 U.S. at 377. In Weems, the Court dealt with a sentence
imposed by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for the crime of falsifying a
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cruel and unusual punishment, it would be considered excessive
and thus prohibited "for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 28
Third, despite early rulings to the contrary, 29 the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment does
govern the actions of the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. 30
B. Death Is Different: The Eighth Amendment and the Death
Penalty
As the Court has stated many times, the punishment of
death is unique and qualitatively different than any other
punishment. 31  Thus, in addition to the general Eighth
Amendment safeguards discussed above, the Court has
interpreted the amendment as guaranteeing constitutional
protections for death penalty defendants that are not available to
those defendants facing lesser penalties.32
This "death is different"33 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
began with the Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia. Furman
public document. Id. at 357-58. The punishment imposed was fifteen years of
Cadena, id. at 358, which involved hard labor, loss of rights, and surveillance for
life, id. at 364. In response to this punishment, the Court stated, "It is cruel in its
excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is
unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the bill
of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." Id. at 377 (emphasis added); see
also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the
cruel and unusual punishments clause does apply to disproportionate punishments);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that imprisonment of
ninety days for narcotic addiction is cruel and unusual punishment).
28 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
29 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890) (refusing to apply the Eighth
Amendment to the states and instead analyzing the issue solely on the grounds of
whether due process had been violated).
30 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the
Eighth Amendment is "applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
31 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (declaring that there is a "qualitative
difference between death and all other penalties"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 287 (1976) (plurality opinion) (determining that the issue to be decided
was the proper procedure "employed by the State to select persons for the unique
and irreversible penalty of death"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that the penalty of death is "unusual in its
pain, in its finality, and in its enormity").
32 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (refusing to extend the constitutional
requirement of individualized sentencing from capital cases to non-capital cases).
33 See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining
the use of the term and criticizing its constitutional foundations).
20031
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consisted of a one paragraph per curiam opinion holding that the
imposition of the death penalty on three specific defendants was
cruel and unusual punishment. The Justices wrote separate
opinions, 34 and, given the voting breakdown, the opinions of
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White deserve the most
attention. 35 The crux of their opinions was that the Eighth
Amendment was violated by statutes that allowed the death
penalty to be "wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed.3 6  The
statutes at issue resulted in this situation because of their
complete delegation of discretion to judges or juries. 37 Justice
Douglas framed this argument in the context of discrimination.
In a system in which "[p] eople live or die, dependent on the whim
of one man or of [twelve],"38 the result will inevitably be the
selective imposition of the death penalty on minorities, outcasts,
and unpopular groups. 39 Justice Douglas's attack on unlimited
jury discretion was echoed by Justice Stewart, who declared,
"These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.... [T]he
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."40
These Justices determined that death penalty statutes that
resulted in infrequent imposition of death and that provided "no
meaningful basis for distinguishing" those cases deserving of its
34 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
35 These three Justices were joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in filing
opinions supporting the per curiam judgment. The latter Justices, however,
concurred on the ground that the death penalty is always cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
36 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). Justice White explained that the issue
before the Court was the constitutionality of a death penalty statute in which "the
legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind of
case... but delegates to judges or juries the decisions as to those cases, if any, in
which the penalty will be utilized .... Id. (White, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,
479-84 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (giving an overview of the racial concerns
that fueled the Furman ruling, especially as expressed in the opinion of Justice
Douglas).
40 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart was
troubled with the result that offenders "just as reprehensible as these" were
receiving different punishments for no rational reason. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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imposition from those that were not so deserving, violated the
Eighth Amendment.41
1. The Application of the Furman Criticisms
Following Furman v. Georgia, the Court concretely
elucidated the safeguards present in the Eighth Amendment,
which it had only hinted at in Furman. The Court first outlined
these requirements in its 1976 ruling in Gregg v. Georgia.42
The first requirement announced by the Gregg plurality4 3
was that jury discretion must be channeled so as to focus the
jury's attention on "the specific circumstances of the crime."44
41 Id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring). The dissenters seemed incredulous
concerning both of these criticisms. Regarding the infrequency of its imposition,
Chief Justice Burger wrote, "The selectivity of juries in imposing the punishment of
death is properly viewed as a refinement on, rather than a repudiation of, the
statutory authorization for that penalty." Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger concluded that, in effect, the criticism amounted to a statement that
"the flexible sentencing system created by the legislatures, and carried out by juries
and judges, has yielded more mercy than the Eighth Amendment can stand." Id. at
398 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Turning to the requirement that death penalty
statutes must distinguish between worthy and unworthy recipients, the dissenters
were even more incredulous. Chief Justice Burger cited the Court's ruling, only one
year earlier, in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Id. at 399 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). In McGautha, the Court considered the claim that death penalty
statutes that did not guide jury discretion violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196. The Court ruled that this was
not the case. Id. at 207. In so doing, the Court concluded:
The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly
awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with
due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a
variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence
or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog
the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than
expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever
be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case
would make general standards either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need.
Id. at 207-08. In Furman, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that McGautha was
not an Eighth Amendment case, but he argued that the criticism of untrammeled
jury discretion was a procedural argument and thus more at home with the
Fourteenth Amendment and barred by the ruling in McGautha. Furman, 408 U.S.
at 399 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe better view is that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was intended to place only substantive limitations on
punishments, not procedural requirements on sentencing.. .
42 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
43 The plurality consisted of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Id. at 158.
4 Id. at 197.
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The statute in Gregg achieved this by requiring that the jury
find that a statutory aggravating circumstance existed before it
could even consider imposing the death penalty.45 According to
the Court, this alleviated the concern expressed in Furman that
the death penalty was capriciously imposed, since the articulated
standards for the jury created a meaningful system for
distinguishing between those defendants who received the death
penalty and those who did not.46
Since Gregg, the Court has clarified the requirement that
jury discretion be channeled. In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Court
ruled that where the sole aggravating factor was that the crime
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" the
imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment.47  The Court concluded that because the
aggravating factor of wantonness did not adequately distinguish
those defendants deserving of the death penalty from the
average murderer, it reintroduced arbitrariness into the jury's
decision.48 In Booth v. Maryland,49 the Court restated this
Eighth Amendment requirement as one of "reasoned
decisionmaking" in death penalty cases.50
The second Eighth Amendment requirement announced by
the Gregg plurality was that the sentencing body must consider
the particularized circumstances of the individual defendant. 51
The sentencing body must have sufficient information to make
an informed decision, which includes having information about
45 Id. at 196-97.
46 Id. at 198.
47 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 433 ("The petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a
consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder."); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (2002) (stating that the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence has been aimed at ensuring that "only the most
deserving of execution are put to death").
49 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987) (ruling that victim impact statements had no
bearing on the blameworthiness of the defendant and thus could not be
constitutionally used), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
50 Id. at 509. In overruling Booth, the Court objected to the relative inequalities
that had been created between the defendant's ability to present a flattering picture
of himself, and the prosecution's inability to offer any evidence which tended to
show the harm that the defendant's actions had caused. See Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991).
51 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 ("[T]he jury's attention is focused on the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime: Does he have a record of
prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special facts about this
defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment....").
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the character and circumstances of the particular defendant.52
In Woodson v. North Carolina, which was decided on the same
day as Gregg, the Court declared that individualized sentencing
for capital crimes was necessary so that individual defendants
were not treated "as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death."53
The general requirement of individualized sentencing in
capital cases has been clarified by the Court on numerous
occasions. First, defendants in capital cases must be allowed to
present any and all evidence that could function in a mitigating
fashion.54 Second, the sentencing body may not exclude from its
consideration, as a matter of law, any mitigating evidence
presented to it.55 Third, death penalty statutes must be designed
so that sentencing bodies have a vehicle for giving effect to the
mitigating evidence presented.56 Thus, the Eighth Amendment
52 See id. at 189 & n.38; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (plurality
opinion) ("A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence
not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be
imposed.").
53 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion); see
also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("The belief no longer prevails
that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without
regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.").
54 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). The statute
at issue in Lockett provided for only a small number of statutorily enumerated
factors that could be used in mitigation. Id. at 608. The Court deemed this statute to
be unconstitutional, because by limiting mitigating evidence it "create[d] the risk
that the death penalty [would] be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a
less severe penalty." Id. at 605. But see id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By
encouraging defendants in capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and
juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a 'mitigating
circumstance,' it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it.").
See generally Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 492-96 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing the inevitable clash between channeling jury discretion and
requiring the consideration of any and all evidence that could be used in mitigation).
55 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (ruling that trial
judge improperly decided that he could not consider evidence of the defendant's
family history in mitigation).
56 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001). In Penry v. Johnson, the
Court found that a supplemental instruction designed to ameliorate the
constitutional deficiencies found in the Texas death penalty statute in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), was insufficient because the jury could only give
effect to the mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation by, in effect,
lying and disregarding its oath. Id. at 798-800; see also Timothy S. Hall, Legal
Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded
Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 361-64 (2002) (discussing
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requires that mitigating evidence be unlimited, fully considered,
and amenable to effectuation in support of the defendant.5 7
2. The Dual Deficiencies of the Mandatory Death Penalty
Responding to the Furman Court's prohibition against
arbitrarily-imposed death penalty statutes, some states amended
their death penalty statutes to provide for mandatory sentences
of death as the punishment for certain crimes.58 The Court
found that this response violated both of the Eighth Amendment
requirements announced by Gregg.5 9
The most obvious deficiency of mandatory death penalty
statutes is that by "fail[ing] to allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of
each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death" they do not provide the individualized
sentencing required by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty
cases.60 The Supreme Court has ruled that this deficiency
cannot be overcome, even by narrowing the effect of the
mandatory death penalty to apply only to those murderers who
were previously sentenced to life without parole for another
crime.61
The Supreme Court has also held that the mandatory death
penalty violates the requirement that jury discretion be
channeled. 62 This somewhat counter-intuitive argument 3 relies
on the premise that sentencing juries will exercise untrammeled,
yet uninformed, discretion through nullification.64  Thus,
the problems with the system set up by Texas as a response to Penry v. Lynaugh).
57 See Penry, 532 U.S. at 797.
58 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-86.
59 See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the two requirements announced
in Gregg).
60 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
61 See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 80-82 (1987) (ruling that just because a
defendant was previously convicted and sentenced to life without parole does not
mean that there are not mitigating factors which would militate against the
imposition of the death penalty).
62 See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36.
63 See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 360 (White, J., dissenting) ("If it is truly the case
that Louisiana juries will exercise too much discretion-and I do not agree that it
is-then it seems strange indeed that the statute is also invalidated because it
purports to give the jury too little discretion by making the death penalty
mandatory.").
64 See id. at 335 & n.11 (discussing the possibility that juries will engage in
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although the mandatory death penalty might have been thought
to solve the problems inherent in allowing jury discretion, the
Court ruled that it fostered arbitrary and capricious decision-
making and thus was in violation of the Eighth Amendment.65
Related to both of these deficiencies is the notion that jury
discretion should be channeled so as to result in the imposition
of the death penalty on those defendants who are most
blameworthy. By precluding meaningful individualized
consideration of the defendant's blameworthiness vis-A-vis the
death penalty66 and by eliminating all jury discretion upon
conviction of specified crimes, the mandatory death penalty
creates a situation, found intolerable by Furman, in which there
is no meaningful basis for distinguishing those defendants who
get the death penalty from those that do not.67
C. The Superfluity of Safeguards for Some
While the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
provide constitutional safeguards for those defendants facing
capital punishment, it also did not hesitate to use the Eighth
Amendment concepts of "evolving standards of decency" and
proportionality68 to limit the number of defendants upon which
nullification, thus reintroducing the element of capriciousness into the sentencing
decision); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03. The Woodson Court relied on the history of
mandatory death penalty statutes to conclude that nullification is a very real
problem, especially in light of the fact that sentencing juries in such a situation will
not be presented with standards so as to determine which defendants are the most
deserving of death. Id. at 303.
65 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 ("Instead of rationalizing the sentencing
process, a mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman
by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act
lawlessly.").
66 By this I mean that jury nullification is not an ideal or particularly tolerable
method of expressing the belief that a particular defendant should not get the death
penalty. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 ("Nineteenth century journalists, statesmen,
and jurists repeatedly observed that jurors were often deterred from convicting
palpably guilty men of first-degree murder under mandatory statutes.").
67 Cf Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 80 n.8 (1987). The Court stated:
Mandating that sentences imposed on inmates serving life terms be
different from sentences imposed on other inmates could produce the odd
result of a riot's more culpable participant's being accorded a less harsh
sentence than the less culpable participant simply because the less
culpable one is serving a life sentence and the more culpable one is serving
a sentence of years.
Id.
68 See discussion supra Part I.A.
2003]
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that penalty could be imposed. Relying on its rulings in Coker v.
Georgia,69 and Ford v. Wainwright,70 the Court applied these
principles to certain classes of criminals.71
The first class of individuals that the Court examined was
juveniles. Using a two-step approach, a plurality of the Court in
Thompson v. Oklahoma determined that the imposition of the
death penalty on defendants who committed their crimes while
under sixteen years of age offended the Eighth Amendment.
72
First, the plurality looked to the objective factors of the actions of
legislatures and sentencing juries to determine if the juvenile
death penalty was accepted by society. The plurality discovered
that all states that had addressed the issue had determined that
sixteen would be the minimum age for which a defendant would
be eligible to receive the death penalty.73 The plurality also
concluded that the death penalty was rarely imposed on
juveniles by sentencing juries.7 4 Thus, based on these objective
factors, the plurality concluded that the execution of defendants
who were under sixteen years of age at the time of their crimes
was "generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community"75
and thus offensive to "civilized standards of decency."76
The plurality next conducted its own proportionality
review77 to determine if the punishment of death was an
69 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
70 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
71 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (citing Ford and Coker for
the proposition that certain classes of criminals are exempt from the imposition of
the death penalty); discussion infra Part II.A.
72 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion). See
infra note 85 (discussing the Court's holding as expressed in the concurring opinion
of Justice O'Connor); see also Linda Andr6-Wells, Imposing the Death Penalty upon
Juvenile Offenders: A Current Application of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 N.M. L. REV. 373, 381-83 (1991)
(discussing the ruling in Thompson). See generally Susan M. Boland, Bibliography,
Walking the Edge of Death: An Annotated Bibliography on Juveniles, the Mentally
Ill, the Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 131 (2001)
(collecting cases and secondary materials).
73 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
74 Id. at 832-33.
75 Id. at 832.
76 Id. at 830.
77 Id. at 833 (discussing the persuasive nature of the actions of legislatures and
juries, but indicating that it was ultimately the Court's job to determine if the
punishment was constitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ("[Tihe Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
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excessive one.78 Pointing to the limited rights that society allows
juveniles to enjoy,79 the plurality determined that "adolescents
as a class are less mature and responsible than adults."80 The
plurality next looked to the principles of punishment that are
generally considered the proper purposes of capital
punishment.8' The plurality concluded that given the lesser
culpability of juveniles, retribution was simply not a legitimate
response to juvenile crime.8 2 Deterrence was deemed equally
inapplicable because of the unlikelihood that juveniles
considered the possibility of execution when weighing the
consequences of their behavior.8 3 Thus, the plurality determined
that imposition of the death penalty on juveniles under sixteen
served no valid purpose and was excessive and
unconstitutional.8 4 Justice O'Connor, who concurred on much
narrower grounds,8 5 refused to accept the proportionality
analysis of the plurality. Justice O'Connor argued that the
general observation that juveniles are less blameworthy than
adults does not compel the conclusion "that all 15-year-olds are
incapable of the moral culpability that would justify the
imposition of capital punishment."8 6 One year later, in Stanford
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
78 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834-36. The Coker Court explained that punishment
is disproportional if it "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment" or is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker, 433
U.S. at 592.
79 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-25. But see id. at 871 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe degree of maturity that is necessary fully to appreciate the pros and cons of
smoking cigarettes, or even of marrying, may be somewhat greater than the degree
necessary fully to appreciate the pros and cons of brutally killing a human being.");
Warren M. Kato, Note and Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18 J. JUV. L. 112,
128 (1997) (arguing that the denial of certain rights to juveniles has little relevance
to the juvenile death penalty).
80 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
81 See id. at 836; supra note 78 (stating the two prongs of the proportionality
review). Given that the crime here is murder, there can be little argument that the
second prong (punishment is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime)
could be established.
82 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-37.
83 Id. at 837-38. The plurality did not mention the goal of incapacitation. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing
incapacitation as a purpose of the death penalty).
84 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
85 Id. at 857-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (deciding this case only on the basis
that it would be unconstitutional to execute a defendant under sixteen when the
state's death penalty statute does not specify a minimum age).
86 Id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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v. Kentucky, the Court refused to follow the Thompson plurality,
albeit in a case concerning sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
defendants."8
The second class of individuals examined by the Court were
the mentally retarded. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court
undertook the same analysis as in Thompson, but it concluded
that the objective standards used to determine evolving
standards of decency did not reflect that society had turned away
from executing mentally retarded defendants.88 The Court, thus,
did not find that the execution of the mentally retarded violated
the Eighth Amendment.8 9
As discussed in the introduction to this Note, however, this
all changed with the Court's ruling in Atkins v. Virginia. Like
the Thompson plurality before it, the Atkins Court first
examined the actions of legislatures and sentencing juries. The
Court noted that since Penry there had been a consistent move
among the states toward outlawing the execution of the mentally
retarded.90  Also, even where the practice was allowed,
sentencing juries infrequently made use of it.91 Thus, the Court
87 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Court recently denied a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Stanford. Four justices dissented and
opined that the Stanford opinion should be revisited. See In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct.
472, 472 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24,
24 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion that the Court should re-
examine its decision in Stanford); Andr6-Wells, supra note 72, at 383-85 (discussing
the Court's ruling in Stanford).
88 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989).
89 Id. at 335. The Court held that the jury did not have a "vehicle for expressing
its 'reasoned moral response' "to the mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental
retardation, and thus remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 328; see also John
J. Gruttadaurio, Note, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to
Juveniles and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CIN.
L. REV. 211, 216-22 (1989) (predicting the ruling in Penry based on the briefs filed
in the case, and discussing the problems with the Texas system regarding
mitigating evidence); supra Part I.B.1.
90 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-49 (2002); cf Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining the danger of declaring that a
societal consensus exists since the result would be "frozen into constitutional law,
making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject"). But see id. at 2263
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's reliance on the fact that legislative
change was universally towards outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded
given that change in the other direction would have been impossible).
91 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 (stating that the execution of the mentally
retarded is rare). But see id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that execution
of mentally retarded might not be uncommon and that if it is, this is easily
explained by their relative rarity in society as well as by that condition's status as a
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concluded that the execution of the mentally retarded "has
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it." 92
Following this examination of the objective factors, the
Court applied a proportionality analysis. As in Thompson, the
Court looked to see whether the principles of punishment were
furthered by the execution of members of this class, which it
deemed to have diminished personal culpability.93 The Court
concluded that because of this limited culpability, mentally
retarded defendants were not deserving of the utmost form of
retribution possible-execution. 94  Similarly, as in Thompson,
the Court concluded that deterrence was inapplicable because of
the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded to consider the
consequences of their behavior.95  Thus, the execution of
mentally retarded defendants was deemed cruel and unusual
punishment. 96
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Court and Classes of Killers: The Blind Imposition of
Evolving Standards of Decency
In applying the "evolving standards of decency" test to
classes of defendants, the Court relied on its decisions in Coker v.
Georgia and Ford v. Wainwright.97 Neither of these two cases,
however, speaks to whether membership in a certain class
should exempt murderers from the death penalty.
mitigating factor).
92 Id. at 2249.
93 Id. at 2250-51. But see id. at 2252 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out
that those mentally retarded defendants who actually face the risk of execution are
those "whose mental retardation has been found an insufficiently compelling reason
to lessen their individual responsibility for the crime"); Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d
338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that if mentally retarded defendant was deemed
capable of being responsible for a crime, then he is capable of being punished for
that crime).
9 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2251 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser
culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.").
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2252.
97 See id. at 2247; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S 302, 329-30 (1989) (citing Ford
and Coker for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits imposing the
death penalty on a certain class of defendants....").
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In Coker v. Georgia, the Court dealt with the question of
whether the death penalty was a cruel and unusual punishment
for the crime of the rape of an adult woman. 98 First, after
examining the actions of legislatures and sentencing juries, the
Court determined that society no longer sanctioned death as an
appropriate punishment for the rape of an adult woman.99 More
specifically, the Court discovered that Georgia was the only state
to allow the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, 100 and
that sentencing juries imposed the penalty in less than ten
percent of cases. 1 1  The Court then conducted its own
proportionality review. Relying primarily on the fact that rape
does not involve the loss of life, the Court concluded that the
penalty of death for the crime of rape is excessive and, therefore,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 102
It would seem reasonable to read Coker as saying that the
violation of statutes prohibiting the rape of an adult woman is
not behavior that is so egregious as to deserve the death
penalty.10 3 In the words of the Coker Court, "[A] sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for
the crime of rape and therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. " 10 4 Despite this
clear reasoning, the Supreme Court has seemingly read the
decision in Coker to exempt from the death penalty a class of
defendants-rapists. The Court has stated, "[TIhe Eighth
Amendment, as a substantive matter, prohibits imposing the
98 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
99 Id. at 597. But see id. at 618 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to
believe that Georgia would long remain alone in punishing rape by death if the next
decade demonstrated a drastic reduction in its incidence of rape .... ").
100 Id. at 594.
101 Id. at 597.
102 Id. at 598. The Court also found it persuasive that allowing capital
punishment for the rapist could lead to a situation where rapists are executed for
their conduct, but where premeditated murderers are not. Id. at 600. But see id. at
619-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing strenuously that there is
constitutional significance to the fact that rape does not end in death). Chief Justice
Burger wrote, "It is, after all, not irrational-nor constitutionally impermissible-
for a legislature to make the penalty more severe than the criminal act it punishes
in the hope it would deter wrongdoing." Id. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
103 In other words, the crime that is committed is not deserving of the
punishment of death. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating that "breaking the law is the sine qua non of punishment").
104 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
[Vol.77:123
A MORE CAPRICIOUS DEATH PENALTY
death penalty on a certain class of defendants because.., of the
nature of their offense."10 5 This reasoning blurs the line between
exempting certain classes from the death penalty and declaring
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for certain
crimes. It is the former which is implicated in Thompson and
Atkins because both concern the punishment that is suitable for
the crime of murder.10 6
The Court's ruling in Enmund v. Florida10 7 is similarly
unpersuasive in this context. In Enmund, the Court conducted
the same two-prong test and concluded that the death penalty
was an excessive punishment for the felony murderer who did
not take life, did not attempt to take life, and did not intend or
contemplate the taking of life. 08 Although Enmund is similar to
both Atkins and Thompson because it concerns the proper
punishment for the crime of murder, its holding is best
understood as reserving the death penalty for those who intend
to commit the crime of murder. That is, the death penalty was
excessive for the crime committed by the defendant in
Enmund.0 9
The rulings in Coker and Enmund thus stand for the
proposition that defendants who commit certain crimes will be
universally exempt from the death penalty because of its
excessiveness as applied to those crimes. The exemptions
105 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 329-30 (emphasis added) (citing Coker for
this proposition).
106 See Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the
Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 272-75 (1989). Hoffmann distinguished these
cases not necessarily on the basis that one involves a class and the other a crime,
but rather using the concept of perfect line-drawing. In other words, by exempting
all rapists, the Court "drew a bright line that corresponded precisely to the very
characteristics that made the death penalty inappropriate, in retributive terms, for
the class of relevant defendants." Id. at 274. On the other hand, age is not a perfect
line. Id. Hoffmann calls age an imperfect proxy because it is not the characteristic
that renders the death penalty inappropriate. Id. at 274-75. Age merely stands in
for such factors as lack of responsibility, poor judgment, and immaturity. Id. at 275.
107 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
108 Id. at 801. But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (ruling that
intent to kill requirement of Enmund is not a good indication of culpability and thus
holding that felony murderer who was a major participant in the crime and who
exhibited reckless indifference to human life may receive the death penalty).
109 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; see also Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 274 (stating
that it was "the defendant's relative lack of culpability with respect to the victim's
death that made the death penalty unjust").
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created by the Court in Atkins, and contemplated by the
plurality in Thompson, are antithetical to this concept. 110
The other authority that the Court has relied on for its
application of evolving standards of decency to classes of
defendants is its ruling in Ford v. Wainwright. In Ford, the
Court was faced with the question of whether it was cruel and
unusual punishment to execute a man who had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death, but who later became insane."'
The Court determined that no states allowed the execution of the
insane and that the practice was historically considered cruel
and unusual. 1 2 Given this history, as well as the limited
retributive value of executing someone who has no
comprehension of why he is being punished, the Court concluded
that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out
a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane."1 13 This
holding, however, becomes an issue "only after the prisoner has
been validly convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to
death.""14 That is, the question raised and answered by the
ruling in Ford "is not whether, but when" the execution of the
prisoner could take place."15 Atkins and Thompson, on the other
hand, deal exclusively with the question of "whether." The
distinction is crucial because Ford does not exempt anyone from
being validly sentenced to death."16
110 See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 275 (declaring that exemption of juveniles
or any other class on the basis of imperfect proxy would be "an unprecedented step
in the modern-day jurisprudence of the [E]ighth [A]mendment"); Seung Oh Kang,
The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance: Preservation of the Capital
Defendant's Constitutional Rights Pursuant to Traditional Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 771 (1994) (noting the unwillingness of
the Court and commentators to declare that age alone exempts one from the death
penalty); David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the
Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1360 (1993)
(stating that the crime of capital murder deserves the death penalty and that a
categorical exemption for the mentally retarded gives them a license to kill).
111 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401-05 (1986).
112 Id. at 406-08.
113 Id. at 409-10; see also Hall, supra note 56, at 337-40 (discussing Ford v.
Wainwright and arguing that the holding actually speaks to competence, not
insanity).
114 Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring).
11 Id. Justice Powell stated, and it was not in contention that, "[Tihe State has
a substantial and legitimate interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for his
crime." Id. Thus, "[If petitioner is cured of his disease, the State is free to execute
him." Id. at n.5.
116 Obviously, if the defendant was insane at the time of the crime, then this
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In addition to a lack of precedent, the Court's application of
the "evolving standards of decency" test to classes of defendants
would lead to unacceptable results. In the second part of its
"evolving standards of decency" test, the Court looks to the
actions of sentencing juries. The Court has explained that the
actions of these bodies are a "significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because [they are] so directly
involved."11 7 Thus in Atkins and in Thompson, the Court found
it persuasive that sentencing juries rarely imposed the death
penalty on mentally retarded and juveniles defendants,
respectively. 118
If this rarity of imposition is all that is needed, 119 then the
Court can just as easily exempt a number of other classes from
the death penalty. For example, despite accounting for roughly
ten percent of murder arrests, women constitute only 1.2% of the
executions that have taken place since 1973.120 If the statistic in
would be a valid defense to the crime, and would not merely spare that defendant
from the death penalty. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332 (1989) ("The
common law prohibition against punishing 'idiots' and 'lunatics' for criminal acts
was the precursor of the insanity defense, which today generally includes 'mental
defect' as well as 'mental disease' as part of the legal definition of insanity."); see
also Hall, supra note 56, at 329-31 (discussing the exculpatory character of the
insanity defense).
117 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg for this
proposition).
118 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (2002) ("Moreover, even in
those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is
uncommon."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832-33 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (citing statistics showing that of 1393 persons sentenced to death between
1982 and 1986, only five of them were less than sixteen years old at the time of the
offense).
119 The Court has said that the legislation enacted by the states is "[t]he
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values," Penry, 492
U.S. at 331, but as will be discussed below, legislation is not constitutionally
possible in the areas to be discussed. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 870-71 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the only justification used by the plurality for the
exemption of those under sixteen years of age from the death penalty is "our own
predeliction for converting a statistical rarity of occurrence into an absolute
constitutional ban").
120 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders: January 1, 1973,
Through December 31, 2002, available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/
femdeath.htm (Jan. 9, 2003). The period from 1973 to the present has seen 807
executions. Ten of these were of women. Id. Streib does report that the execution of
females has increased since 1998, but their share of total executions for this period
still equals only 2.3%. Id. Women account for roughly 10% of murder arrests. Id.; see
also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 870-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that the same
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Coker, that Georgia juries imposed death on less than ten
percent of rapists,' 2' was found to show that society had rejected
the punishment of death for rapists, then these statistics
overwhelmingly show that the execution of women has been
rejected by society as well. 122 Similarly, a look at the statistics
cited in Furman reveal that the Coker Court should have
excluded a different class of defendants from the death penalty.
Between 1930 and 1972, of the 455 persons executed for rape,
only forty-eight were white. 123 In Georgia, only three of the
sixty-one persons executed for rape were white. 24  The
conclusion could be drawn that sentencing juries had rejected
the death penalty for the class of white rapists only.125 Although
this is a logical result of simply applying the "evolving standards
of decency" test, it is surely considered an intolerable conclusion.
analysis used for juveniles could just as easily be applied to women); Andrea
Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 427, 430-31 (2000) (arguing that the infrequent imposition
of the death penalty on women reveals an Equal Protection violation by the states).
Compare Streib supra (finding that states executed five women between 1984 and
2000), with Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing statistics that
show that thirty-five allegedly mentally retarded defendants were executed during
the same period).
121 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
122 For the same reason that legislatures would not be able to institute such a
rule, this conclusion cannot stand. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment will not allow such discrimination based on gender absent a showing
that it is substantially related to important governmental objectives. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 provides, in pertinent part, that no State shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.; see also
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 871 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Surely the conclusion is not that
it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment upon a woman."); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (explaining the test to be applied
when classification is based on gender); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979)
(same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("It
is difficult to understand why women have received such favored treatment since
the purposes allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally
applicable to both sexes.").
123 Furman, 408 U.S. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
124 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 482 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
brief in Jackson v. Georgia).
125 Of course, these figures could be the result of the number of black and white
defendants, respectively, being tried for rape. Given their respective proportions of
the population, however, this seems highly unlikely. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-
65 (Marshall, J., concurring) (acknowledging that a higher crime rate may be
partially responsible for the overrepresentation of blacks among the executed, but
concluding that the figures reveal racial discrimination).
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B. Individualized No More: The Effect of Exempting Classes
from the Death Penalty
The exemptions issued by the Court in Atkins and
contemplated in Thompson, besides being speciously supported
and amenable to dangerous expansion, are contrary to the spirit
of Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence as expressed
in the ideal of individualized sentencing and ultimately, to the
tenets of the Eighth Amendment as expressed by Furman and
its progeny.
1. The Spirit of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Individualized Sentencing
Individualized sentencing is a constitutional prerequisite for
the imposition of the death penalty. Much like mandatory death
penalty statutes, however, class exemptions treat individual
defendants "not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass."126 The creation of
homogenous classes 127 universally exempt from the death
penalty has the effect of abrogating the duties of the jury. As
can be expected, in an area where individualized consideration is
paramount, the Court has emphasized the importance of the jury
in death penalty cases.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court declared, "[Olne of the
most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain
a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment
could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.' "128 Just four days after the
126 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion); see
also Kang, supra note 110, at 776 ("A bright-line test excluding the entire class of
youths from the death penalty, however, would negate an individualized
examination."); Kato, supra note 79, at 135-36 (decrying the Thompson plurality's
reliance on cases requiring individual sentencing while at the same time completely
destroying individualization for the class of defendants under sixteen years of age).
127 See Rumley, supra note 110, at 1320-25 (discussing the various
classifications of mental retardation and concluding that "[mientally retarded
individuals are not a homogenous group."); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (explaining that mentally retarded individuals
are not "all cut from the same pattern"); Andrd-Wells, supra note 72, at 386
("Perhaps the drafters of the Constitution declined to set a minimum age at which a
state may impose a sentence of death because there is no magic age at which all
individuals achieve competency.").
128 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v.
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ruling in Atkins, the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in Ring
v. Arizona proclaimed, "[T]he jury remains uniquely capable of
determining whether, given the community's views, capital
punishment is appropriate in the particular case at hand."129 It
goes without saying that exempting classes of individuals from
the imposition of the death penalty robs the jury of this ability to
determine the punishment that the community seeks to impose
on each particular defendant. The result is punishment by class,
a result that was explicitly rejected by the Court in its decisions
examining mandatory death penalty statutes. In the words of
the Court, "a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency."130
2. The Court Re-introduces Caprice
The Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment by the state. In the field of
capital punishment, these protections become even more
pronounced. The argument is easily made that individualized
sentencing is a safeguard reserved for the capital defendant
alone131 and thus should not be used as a weapon against him.132
The argument concludes that because the Court has determined
that certain classes cannot be subject to the death penalty, then
individual defendants that are part of those classes obviously do
not require the added protection that individualized sentencing
provides.
This argument, however, is flawed. By focusing entirely on
individualized sentencing, it ignores the existence and objective
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). The Court explained that the jury must "express
the conscience of the community." Id. at 519. The Court in Witherspoon concluded
that a jury which was selected by the elimination of potential jurors who expressed
general objections to the death penalty could not so express the conscience of the
community. Id. at 522.
129 Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2447 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
130 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
131 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (refusing to extend
individualized sentencing to cases dealing with life without parole); State v.
Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 328-29 (S.C. 2002) (deciding after Atkins that a sentence
of life without parole does not require individual sentencing).
132 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the mitigating
nature of the individualized sentencing requirement).
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of the other procedural safeguard promulgated by the Gregg
Court-channeled jury discretion.133
Channeled jury discretion ensures that, as constitutionally
required, a meaningful basis exists for distinguishing between
those defendants who receive the death penalty and those who
do not. By ruling that the death penalty cannot be considered
for entire classes of defendants, the Court has created a situation
that violates this goal.
The first problem is that the lines drawn by the Court's
categories are not, in and of themselves, a meaningful basis for
distinguishing between those defendants that receive the death
penalty and those that do not. It is easy to imagine a set of
comparable murders committed by individuals with comparable
backgrounds. If, however, the IQ of one individual places him
just within the range of mental retardation, and the IQ of the
other places him just outside that range, then the result could be
that one is subject to the death penalty while the other is not. 34
In this case, the only distinction to be made was that one
defendant was classified as being mentally retarded, while the
other was not. If this factor does not provide a meaningful basis
for distinguishing between those defendants who are death-
eligible and those who are not, then a system which decides on
this basis is in violation of the Eighth Amendment 35
By requiring that a defendant belong to the class of non-
mentally retarded individuals before a death sentence may be
imposed, the Court, in effect, made that status an aggravating
factor. 3 6 In Godfrey, the Court determined that the aggravating
factor of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"
conduct, on its own, was not sufficient for distinguishing
133 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
134 See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 245 (posing a similar hypothetical framed
in the context of Tison and arguing that minority status should not save one
defendant if he was equally as culpable as the other).
135 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the aggravating circumstance of wanton conduct did not distinguish
those defendants worthy of the death penalty from those who were not). But see
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1987) ("[Albsent a showing that the...
capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, [the
defendant] cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.").
136 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating
that an aggravating factor must be found before death sentence may be imposed);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same).
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between those murderers who were deserving of the death
penalty and the average murderer. 137 When compared to the
aggravating factor found lacking in Godfrey, it becomes clear
that the non-mentally retarded aggravating factor is even more
constitutionally deficient. Although it is not contended here that
the status of non-mentally retarded on its own would be
sufficient for a sentence of death, it is helpful to consider that
factor in connection with the presence of other factors. For
example, in the above hypothetical, if both murderers had
committed their crimes for the purpose of receiving money, 138
then both would be eligible to receive the death penalty. But, if
the aggravating factor of non-mentally retarded was required as
well, then only one of the murderers would be eligible for
execution. Thus, the only distinction between the two would be
the aggravating factor of being non-mentally retarded. Given
that wanton conduct alone was deemed an insufficient basis for
distinguishing between the average murderer and one who is
deserving of the death penalty, it seems difficult to maintain
that the status of non-mentally retarded, by itself, provides a
meaningful basis for that distinction. 139
The second problem is that the lines drawn result in the
arbitrary and capricious administration of the death penalty. As
discussed above, the Court determined that mandatory death
137 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.
138 The statute considered in Godfrey consisted of ten aggravating factors, of
which monetary gain was one. Id. at 423 n.2. Others included committing the
murder while engaging in another capital felony, murdering a judicial officer, and
committing the murder while escaping lawful custody. Id at 423-24 n.2.
139 Cf Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 258-59 (stating that age alone does not
provide a meaningful basis for distinction). Unlike wantonness, however, IQ does
benefit from its objective nature and as a result, its easy application. The crux of
this argument is discussed below. See infra notes 140-60 and accompanying text. In
the context of the present argument, that IQ does not in and of itself provide a
meaningful basis for distinction, it is helpful to consider the plethora of other factors
that would be considered more objective than wantonness. A few examples are
weight, height, hair color, name, and education. While, like IQ, some of these factors
may prove to have some value in understanding a particular defendant, they are not
in and of themselves meaningful bases for distinction because they do not have any
relation to the sine qua non of punishment-the crime committed. That is, all or
none of these factors may be useful to a jury in considering a possible punishment,
but none, standing alone, compellingly distinguishes between those defendants who
should face the possibility of death and those who should not. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (positing that a law
exempting individuals who make a certain amount of money would be violative of
the Eighth Amendment because of its arbitrary nature).
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penalty statutes were unconstitutional because they allowed too
much discretion, in the form of uninformed decisions to mitigate
via nullification, and too little discretion, by not allowing the
circumstances of each individual to play a role in sentencing.
Unless the line-drawing in Atkins and Thompson always
corresponds to a reduced applicability of the principles of
punishment served by the death penalty,140 then the result will
be to cause the exact same arbitrary and capricious application
that the Court found intolerable in systems with mandatory
death penalty statutes.
The first penological goal that the Court looks to in
justifying the use of the death penalty is retribution.' 4 ' The
Court has stated, "The heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender." 42 Thus, in exempting
entire classes from the death penalty, the Court has declared
that these groups are less culpable than society as a whole, and
thus retribution in the form of the death penalty is not
appropriate.143
The argument made by the Court, while appealing in its
plea to mercy, is unsatisfactory when compared to the standard
set by the Court itself. Each and every defendant exempted
must be less culpable than the least culpable defendant upon
whom the death penalty is imposed; otherwise the entire system
is fraught with the arbitrariness and capriciousness that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits. 44 It cannot be true that a line
drawn at a certain IQ score 145 or at a certain age146 can perfectly
140 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 & n.28 (identifying the principles of punishment
as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation).
141 See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 247-53, for an excellent discussion of the
various tenets and requirements of retributivism.
142 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
143 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-37 (1988) (plurality opinion).
14 This is not the same as saying that every defendant who receives the death
penalty must be more culpable than those who do not. The Court has recognized
that prosecutorial discretion, jury discretion, and other factors might create
situations where less culpable defendants receive the death penalty and more
culpable defendants do not. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-204. The Court, however,
was concerned with the final decision to impose the death penalty and whether that
procedure "create[d] a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice." Id. at 203. The
issue at hand-exemptions from the death penalty--deals with this final decision by
creating a system that alone determines who may or may not be executed.
145 See Rumley, supra note 110, at 1354-55 ("Mental retardation alone does not
mean that an individual lacks the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act
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predict the relative culpability of each and every defendant who
falls within (or without) its bounds. 147 Although this creation of
classifications might serve the practical purpose of being easy to
administer,148 that effect is an unfit justification in a system that
requires reasoned decision-making. 149  The argument of
expedience is even more unsatisfactory given that the system is
one that considers the final fate of a defendant charged with a
serious crime. Outside the capital system, the criminal justice
system as a whole is one that considers each and every
individual separately. 50  It is thus hard to maintain that
with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty."). But see
Gruttadaurio, supra note 89, at 228 (proposing the exemption of all mentally
retarded defendants from capital sentencing).
146 See Carver, supra note 23, at 224 (decrying the arbitrariness of drawing a
line at a certain age); Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 272-83 (discussing line-drawing
based on age and concluding that it is not an effective means for determining
culpability for the death penalty). But see Mike Farrell, Sixteenth Annual
International Law Symposium: "Rights of Children in the New Millennium:" On the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 207, 208 (1999); Elisabeth Gasparini,
Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle of a Child's Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REV.
1073, 1090-91 (1998) (arguing that culpability of a juvenile is not same as that of an
adult); Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young to Die-Juveniles and the Death Penalty-
A Better Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391, 416 (1996) ("Juveniles lack the degree of
blameworthiness that is a constitutional prerequisite for the imposition of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.").
147 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2266 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Surely culpability, and deservedness of the most severe retribution, depends not
merely (if at all) upon the mental capacity of the criminal (above the level where he
is able to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon the depravity of the
crime....").
148 See Kato, supra note 79, at 139 ("One of the benefits of line-drawing is
practicality.").
149 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
150 This is not to say that individualized consideration in sentencing exists
outside the capital scheme. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991)
(refusing to extend the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing
beyond the capital system); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962) (stating that the
constitutionality of statutes that impose mandatory sentences on repeat offenders
"is no longer open to serious challenge"). Rather, the argument is simply that, on
the whole, the criminal justice system deals with each defendant as a unique
person. This is obvious when the system is compared to voting and driving laws. See
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.). The
individualized treatment afforded by this country's criminal justice system is also
evident when compared to systems allowing bills of attainder. See United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-49 (1965) (discussing the history of bills of attainder and
the Constitution's prohibition of their enactment).
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generalizations about culpability are justified based on their
expedience.' 51
The second goal looked to by the Court is deterrence. 152 In
Atkins and Thompson the Court found that deterrence, as a goal
for the imposition of the death penalty, was inapplicable to the
respective classes because of the inability of members of those
classes to consider the consequences of their actions. The
Court's deterrence argument suffers from a number of
shortcomings. The most glaring of these problems is that the
Court, in effect, ruled that those individuals who were not
deterred by the threat of capital punishment, because of their
age or IQ, belonged to a class of defendants who are not deterred
by capital punishment. The circularity of this argument is
obvious. 15 3 Besides this shortcoming, the Court's argument
suffers from the same deficiency that plagued its argument
151 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Justice Scalia
stated:
[Age statutes] do not represent a social judgment that all persons under
the designated ages are not responsible enough to drive, to drink, or to
vote, but at most a judgment that the vast majority are not. These laws set
the appropriate ages for the operation of a system that makes its
determinations in gross, and that does not conduct individualized maturity
tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal justice system,
however, does provide individualized testing.
Id.; see also Kato, supra note 79, at 140 (arguing that practicality of line-drawing is
not required in a system of individualized judgment). The above argument also
raises the question of whether the exemptions created by the Court have a rational
basis such as to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause regarding
classifications based on age and mental retardation. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (explaining that classification based on age subject to rational
basis test); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(finding that rational basis test applies to classifications based on mental
retardation). Given that the criminal justice system is engaged in an individualized
determination of culpability, is it rational to create a system of classifications that
generalizes the actor's level of culpability based on class membership? Compare Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (ruling that there was no rationale for using sex as
a proxy for need in an alimony statute since "individualized hearings at which the
parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur"), with Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976) (declaring that classification based
on age is not irrational just because state did not choose to institute a system of
individualized testing).
152 See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2251 ("The theory of deterrence in capital
sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the
punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.").
153 See Carver, supra note 23, at 198-99 (discussing the problem of evaluating
the effects of deterrence because those who commit crimes are the ones that
obviously were not deterred).
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concerning retribution. Why does a year or an IQ point
definitively state the point at which one can be deterred? 154
The final goal of capital punishment is incapacitation. 155
Unlike retribution and deterrence, however, incapacitation is not
universally mentioned by the Court as a justification for capital
punishment. Dissenting in Atkins, Justice Scalia declared, "The
Court conveniently ignores a third 'social purpose' of the death
penalty-'incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the
consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit
in the future.' ",156 The incapacitation rationale for the death
penalty is summed up simply by saying that "death finally
forecloses the possibility that a prisoner will commit further
crimes, whereas life imprisonment does not."1 57 There can be no
argument that incapacitation, as a justification for the death
penalty, does not apply to mentally retarded and juvenile
murderers. 58
In sum, a system that exempts juveniles and the mentally
retarded from the death penalty suffers from the same
deficiencies as the mandatory death penalty. First, the jury is
given no discretion to decide, based on the particular
circumstances of the case, whether the death penalty is an
appropriate punishment. 159 Second, it can be said that the
154 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("[1]t is not demonstrable
that no 16-year-old is 'adequately responsible' or significantly deterred.").
155 See generally Kato, supra note 79, at 147-48 (discussing incapacitation).
156 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976)).
157 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); see
also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 605-06 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The
Court's holding, moreover, bars Georgia from guaranteeing its citizens that they
will suffer no further attacks by this habitual rapist.").
158 In fact, an argument can be made that incapacitation is a stronger
justification for the death penalty as applied to mentally retarded and juvenile
criminals. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993) (holding that it is not
unconstitutionally impermissible that a death penalty statute allowed the jury to
consider the defendant's youth as an aggravating factor when determining future
dangerousness); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989) (discussing the danger
that mitigating evidence of mental retardation will be given the effect of
aggravating evidence because it tends to show an inability to learn from mistakes,
and thus future dangerousness); see also Kato, supra note 79, at 147-48 (arguing
that incapacitation in the form of the juvenile death penalty is needed in order to
eliminate the corrupting influence of the most heinous juvenile criminals on those
that are amenable to reformation).
159 Alone, this statement does not mean much. A jury in a non-capital case
cannot exercise discretion to impose the death penalty either. But here I am
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system is given too much discretion. Broad exemptions based on
class can be seen as decisions to exercise mercy. Unguided
mercy based on meaningless distinctions, however, is the reason
that mandatory death penalty statutes were unconstitutional. 160
The result is arbitrary and capricious administration of the
death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 161
III. SOLUTIONS
The problem addressed by the Court in Atkins and
Thompson is that the most severe of all penalties-the death
penalty-might be imposed on defendants whose class
membership raises the very real possibility that they are not as
culpable as society as a whole. 162 As discussed in this Note,
however, the Court's solution to this problem was to create a
system that is inconsistent with the tenets of the Eighth
Amendment as explicated by the Court in Furman and its
progeny. This Note will now discuss two possible solutions to the
underlying problem which are consistent with the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Declare the Death Penalty to Be Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
The possible injustice of the execution of juveniles and the
mentally retarded that the Court sought to rectify masks a
deeper and more intractable deficiency with the death penalty as
currently applied. Based on the Court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, death penalty statutes must simultaneously
channel jury discretion in order to identify those defendants
most deserving of the death penalty, while also requiring the
jury to consider any and all evidence of a mitigating nature. 163
concerned only with those cases where the jury would have had that discretion, but
for the exemptions announced by the Court.
160 See supra Part I.B.2.
161 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 496 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("We have consistently recognized that the discretion to accord mercy--even if
'largely motivated by the desire to mitigate'-is indistinguishable from the
discretion to impose the death penalty." (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring))).
162 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2244 (2002) (stating that members of
class do not act with the "level of moral culpability that characterizes the most
serious adult criminal conduct"); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 & n.23
(1988) (plurality opinion) (discussing limited culpability of the class).
163 See supra Part I.B.1.
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Thus at the same time that the focus of the jury is being
sharpened, that same jury is also given nearly unlimited
discretion to make its decision however it pleases. 16 4 Given the
Court's belief that not even these safeguards will function to
save undeserving defendants from the death penalty,
165 it
becomes apparent that it may not be possible to write death
penalty statutes in such a way as to meet all of these Eighth
Amendment requirements. It may not be possible to write a
statute that channels discretion, requires individualization and
unlimited mitigating evidence, and creates additional safeguards
for those defendants whose class membership creates the
possibility of limited culpability. Because this task seems
impossible, the death penalty should be declared cruel and
unusual punishment. 166
B. Increased Individualization as the Remedy for Members of
Needy Classes
An alternative solution would solve the problem by
increasing the level of individualized consideration. The
mentally retarded and juveniles will be handled separately here
because of differences between these two groups.
164 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1151-53 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that it is impossible to balance all of the safeguards required by
the Eighth Amendment in capital cases); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373-74
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing the view that consideration of unlimited
mitigating evidence conflicts with the principle of channeled jury discretion);
Graham, 506 U.S. 461, 492-94 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
arbitrariness of allowing jury decisions based on unlimited mitigating evidence).
The Court has ruled that it is constitutional for a jury to be instructed that it cannot
be " 'swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling ..... " California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987).
165 That is, individualized sentencing and unlimited mitigating evidence is not
enough of a safeguard to ensure that juries will be able to determine who is not
sufficiently culpable for the death penalty. See supra note 164.
166 See Calins, 510 U.S. at 1159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (declaring that the
Court should abandon capital punishment because it is unworkable); Shapiro, supra
note 120, at 467 ("It is unreasonable to think that the United States can perfect a
sentencing system that strives to preserve both uniformity and individuality at the
same time."). But see Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
the conclusion reached by Justice Blackmun ignores the fact that the two
diametrically opposed tenets of the Court's Eighth Amendment death penalty
jurisprudence are creations of the Court and not constitutionally provided for).
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1. Rebuttable Presumptions and Mental Retardation
As discussed above, the basic problem is the fear that
mitigating evidence and individualized consideration will not be
sufficient to save those mentally retarded individuals who did
not act with the culpability required for the death penalty.
Instead of avoiding this problem by simply exempting all
mentally retarded defendants, the Court could have required a
rebuttable presumption of insufficient culpability once mental
retardation was established. 167 For example, once a defendant
has shown that he is mentally retarded, the jury could be
instructed to weigh all aggravating and mitigating factors with
the understanding that the defendant's mental retardation
creates a presumption of insufficient culpability which must be
overcome by the aggravating factors. 168 Thus something more
than a simple balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors
would be required for the jury to impose the death penalty. The
scale would be weighed in favor of mentally retarded defendants.
This proposal alleviates the fears that mentally retarded
defendants of limited culpability could be executed despite the
mitigating factor of mental retardation. By interpreting the
Eighth Amendment to require such a presumption, the Court
could have ensured that only deserving mentally retarded
defendants are executed while avoiding the arbitrariness that
results from exempting entire classes of individuals from capital
punishment.
2. One Step Back: Protecting Juveniles in Their Waiver into
Criminal Court
Like the problem of the death penalty and mentally retarded
defendants, the problem of the juvenile death penalty can be
solved by further individualizing the process. The unique
problem posed by juveniles in the capital system is that "the jury
might mistakenly conclude that because the defendant is in an
adult court rather than a juvenile court, the judge has already
taken youth into consideration."16 9 Frequently, however, this is
167 See supra note 12 for a definition of mental retardation that could be used
by courts.
168 Cf Hoffinann, supra note 106, at 270-72 (discussing the possibility that
rebuttable presumption of immaturity could be used for juveniles facing the death
penalty).
169 Gasparini, supra note 146, at 1090.
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not the case. Judicial waiver into criminal court oftentimes is
based on criteria irrelevant to the particular actor's level of
responsibility or culpability. 170  The factors used by states,
including Oklahoma in Thompson, are based 171 on the criteria
set out in an appendix of the Court's decision in Kent v. United
States. 172 Those factors include the seriousness of the offense,
the level of violence used, the prosecutive merit of the case, the
maturity level of the actor, the history of the actor, and the
prospects for rehabilitation given available resources of the
state.173
Based on the multitude of factors used, none of which was
considered by the Court in Kent, 74 it is apparent that the Court
could introduce safeguards at this stage of the proceedings which
would ensure that only those juveniles who exhibited the
requisite culpability could be waived into criminal court.175 For
example, since waiver into criminal court subjects juveniles to
adult punishments, including the possibility of receiving the
death penalty, the Court could declare that the Eighth
Amendment requires that every juvenile defendant be screened
on the basis of his individual culpability alone before waiving
him into criminal court. Thus, only those juveniles who acted
with sufficient culpability would be subject to adult penalties. 176
Once in adult court, moreover, a rebuttable presumption similar
to that discussed for mentally retarded defendants could be used
170 See Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring
Children to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447, 452 (1996);
Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on
Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 713-22 (1998) (discussing at length the
shortcomings of the waiver process); Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of
Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of
Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 771 n.81 (1986) (explaining the many factors in the
waiver decision that overshadow the maturity and culpability of the juvenile).
171 See Federle, supra note 170, at 453-64.
172 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
173 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
174 See id. at 561-63 (deciding the case only on the grounds that procedural
safeguards were violated).
175 See Federle, supra note 170, at 488-89 (explaining that many of the Kent
criteria have absolutely nothing to do with the culpability of the juvenile); Logan,
supra note 170, at 721 ("[Tihere is scant reason to believe that waiver, in whatever
form, serves to winnow in any reliable way only those juveniles that should be
prosecuted as adults.").
176 See Kato, supra note 79, at 129 (stating that certification into adult court
should logically stand for the proposition that those juveniles should receive adult
punishment).
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to ensure that only those juveniles who truly deserve the death
penalty will receive it.177 These safeguards would solve the
problem of unworthy juveniles possibly being executed while
avoiding the problem that would be created by exempting a class
of individuals from the death penalty.178
CONCLUSION
In the sphere of capital punishment, the Eighth Amendment
requires that a number of safeguards be implemented'in order to
avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition of this most serious
of all penalties. Jury discretion must be channeled in order to
identify the most deserving defendants, yet juries must be given
the opportunity to consider any and all evidence that serves to
mitigate the individual's blameworthiness. In Atkins v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court, without relevant precedent, pushed these
safeguards aside and exempted an entire class from capital
punishment. While the potentially far-flung scope of this ruling
was likely not considered by the Court, the real danger lies in its
complete abandonment of the goals that the Eighth Amendment
supposedly stood for. While rhetoric and superficial analysis can
lead to the conclusion that the death penalty today is kinder and
gentler than in years past, constitutional scrutiny reveals it to be
all the more capricious in its imposition.
177 See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 270-72 (discussing rebuttable
presumptions and their applicability to the problem of the juvenile death penalty).
Hoffmann also noted that Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Thompson, seemed to
embrace the idea of a rebuttable presumption in favor of juveniles. Id. at 270.
178 This would have another positive effect as well. Although the Court has
focused on the possible injustices of the juvenile death penalty, it is important to
note that juveniles waived into criminal court can still receive all other adult
punishments, even though the Court has deemed them generally less culpable. See
Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that one-
hundred-year sentence imposed on thirteen-year-old criminal was not cruel and
unusual punishment); State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) ("[Wle find
lengthy sentences or sentences of life without parole imposed upon juveniles do not
violate contemporary standards of decency so as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment."). Thus, by requiring that juveniles be screened on the basis of
culpability alone, only those juveniles most deserving of the whole panoply of adult
punishments would thus receive them. They would receive protection, not only from
the death penalty, but also from all adult punishment. Cf Logan, supra note 170, at
709-13 (discussing the need for proportionality analysis in evaluating the efficacy of
sentences of life without parole when imposed on juveniles).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
